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Legal Fees: A Comparison of the American 
and English Rules 
CHARLES R. PLOTT 
California Institute of Technology 
This note is intended to explore some of the issues raised l)y Avery Katz's 
provocative paper. The question posed in his paper is whether the English 
rule or the American rule generates nmore legal fees. Katz uses game- 
theoretic motivation for the elasticity measures that are central to his analy- 
sis. However, the analysis proceeds in termis of elasticity models so the 
implications of the underlying game theory remain rather obscure. The ap- 
proach taken here is to analyze a game-theoretic model directly to discover 
where the basic principles of the theory lead. The basic approach is simlilar 
to other papers and the contribution here is to work out the details of an 
easy-to-follow example.1 
The answer given by game theory to the question of which generates 
more legal costs is sensitive to the exact formulation of the two rules and 
also to what I will call the "legal production function." The strategy of this 
note is to present formal statements of the rules in section 1. In section 2, 
the legal production function is outlined. Section 3 contains the results and 
section 4 contains some general remarks. 
The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. 
Comments of Jeff Strand and Jennifer Reinganum were helpfil. 
1. See Reinganum and Wilde; and Braeutigam et al. 
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization vol. 3, no. 2 Fall 1987 
? 1987 by Yale University. All rights reserved. ISSN 8756-6222 
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1. THE RULES 
The notation to ble used is as follows: 
x = hours of legal services empl)oyed by the plaintiff. The lower 
case x repriesents a varial)le to b1e determined l)y the plain- 
tiff and the upper case X is the specific quantity that would 
l)e chosen at equilil)riulm. 
y = hours of legal services emlployed i)y the defendant. The 
lower case yi represents a variale to ble determinied by the 
defendant and the upper case Y is the specific (iuantity that 
would l)e chosein by the defendant at e(quililrium. 
C = hourly legal feies so Cx and C! are the total legal fees of the 
plaintiff and the defenidant, respectivelv. 
P(x,F/) = the prolbability that plaintiff wins the case. 
1 - P(x,y) = the probability that defendant wins the case. 
A = the award if plaintiff wins the case. 
In addition to the assumptions implicit in the notation, we will assume 
that all parties choose so as to maximize expected monetary payoff. This 
assumption eliminates risk-averse behavior. 
Three rules are considered: the American rule, the pure English rule, 
and a mixed rule. The distinction between the rules is captured by the 
obljective functions as seen from the point of view of the plaintiff. As will 
become clear, the mixed rule contains the other two as special cases. 
The American rule is distinguished by the fact that each party to litiga- 
tion pays the entirety of his/her own legal fees. Formally, the decision 
problem of the plaintiff is to maximize expected profits by a proper choice 
of x, the number of hours of legal services employed. Expected profits 
depend upon the choice of strategies (x,y) and are defined as: 
nA(x,y) = P(x,y)(A - Cx) + (1 - P(x,y))(-Cx). 
In words, the plaintiff must decide how aggressively the case will be 
pursued. In doing so, the plaintiff is motivated to employ legal services to 
the point that maximizes the expected net benefit of litigation (the product 
of the probability of winning and the award net of fees) minus the expected 
cost of litigation (the product of the probability of losing and the fees of own 
legal services). 
By contrast the English rule induces the expected profit function: 
HE(x,I) = P(x,y)A + (1 - P(x,y))(-Cx - Cy). 
The problem is to find the value of x which maximizes this function. In 
words, the expected value of the award is compared to the expected cost of 
all legal fees to both parties. The prominent feature of the rule is that the 
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plaintiff' pays no legal fees if the plaintiff wins but must pay all legal fees of 
both parties if the plaintiff loses. The defendant faces a similar problem. 
A third rule holds that the winner pays a portion, P, of his own legal 
fees. The loser pays his own fees plus the amount of the legal fees of the 
winner that are not paid by the winner. That is, the loser pays the propor- 
tion (1 - 1) of the legal fees of the winner. The objective function from the 
plaintiff point of view becomes 
Hl,(x,) = P(x,y)(A - PCx) + (1 - P(x,y))(-Cx - (1 - P)Cy). 
Some importaiit features of these formulations should be noted. First, 
the participants o)bey the expected utility hypothesis and are risk neutral. 
Second, the amount of the award is independent of the amount of legal 
talent employed. Third, the possilility of' nonlpaymlent of the award or of 
the legal fees due to financial limitations of' the loser is inot considered. 
These points will be considered again later. 
2. LEGAL TECHNOLOGY 
A very explicit legal technology will be tusedl in the analysis. This technol- 
ogy is emblodied in the prolbability fiunction that expresses the probablility 
that the plaintiff will will the case, that is, P(x,y). InI a ssese this probalility 
reflects the nature of the court system and the )produ(ctivity of tile lawyers 
in that system. In the economics jargoln, it is a p1roductiol fillnctioln for 
lawyers. 
We will assiume the explicit functional form: 
f x 1 - ox 
P(x,y) = ota + --- () t x < 1 
This function has several interesting properties. 
1. The finction is symmetri c b)etween the litigants. That is, the coulrt 
is unbiased toward one or the other aid litigants have equally talented 
lawvers. 
2. The prol)ability of winning goes up if one side inclreases lawyer use 
and the other side does not (assuminig a > 0). 
3. The marginal productivity of a lawyer2 
aP(x,y!) aot 
ax (x + y)2 
2. Strnad suggests that a better prodluction fieitio o f illiglht 1) oine in which thle 1marginal 
productivity of x goes up with y, rather than down as it does in this funiltion. 
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goes down as the total amount of legal effort (x + y) goes up. That is, the 
more time devoted to the case by either or both sides, the less sensitive 
is the likelihood of winning of one side to a small increase in lawyer 
time. 
4. The parameter a measures the sensitivity of the system to the 
1 - o 
effort of the lawyers. The fraction 2 is the part of the probability that 2 
cannot be influenced by lawyers. The parameter a is a measure of the 
power that lawyers have to determine the outcome of the case. If ax=O, 
the system is completely insensitive to what lawyers do and the prob- 
ability of winning is 1/2 regardless of legal efforts. If a=l, then with 
enough expenditure relative to the other side a litigant can make the 
probability of a win as high as is desired. If a=l, the probability of 
winning is completely determined by the effort of the lawyers. 
5. The formulation does not reflect the "merits" of a case independ- 
ent of the efforts of the lawyers. Of course such considerations are of in- 
terest and can be incorporated. For the analysis at hand, it is best to 
consider only "equally meritorious" cases in the sense that without legal 
representation of either party (or only minimal amounts), the probability 
of winning is 1/2. 
3. RESULTS 
The following results are the symmetric Nash e(luilibrium of the noncoop- 
erative game. 
3.1. AMERICAN RULE 
The amounts spent on legal services as predicted by the symmetric Nash 
e(uilibrium of the model when applied to the American rule are 
1 
CX = CY = - aA. 
4 
In words, the legal fees of the plaintiff equal those of the defendant and 
each equals 1/4 aA. So, if a= 1, then each lawyer would be paid 1/ 4 of the 
amnount A, and in total, 1/2 of the award amiount would be used up in legal 
fees. A demonstration of the result will be reserved for the mixed-rule 
case. 
Models of this fornm might hold some suggestions about the structure of 
the American system. For example, Katz notices that on average legal fees 
of plaintiffs in the United States are about 25 percent of the recovery. 
When this statistic is applied to the equilibrium formula above, one can 
deduce that a=l. That is, the Nash equilibrium model in this simplified 
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form and special assumptions taken together with the data suggests that the 
legal production function in the United States is completely lawyer- 
dominated. 
3.2. ENGLISH RULE 
The amounts predicted by the symmetric Nash equilibrium are captured 
by the formula 
1 ox 
CX = CY = - A. 
2 1-ax 
In order to develop some intuition about this result, consider some nu- 
merical assumptions. Assume a= 1/2. That is, one-half of the uncertainty is 
out of the control of lawyers but the other half is determined by the hours 
that lawyers devote to the case. In this case, where the productivity of the 
lawyer is 1/2, the total award is used up in legal fees at the equilibrium. If 
the lawyers are a little Inore productive, say a=2/3, then CX=A and in 
equilibriul each lawyer is paid the entire award amount. As a grows larger 
toward 1, the amounts of hours demainded ()y the plaintiff and the defetn- 
dant grow without bound. 
The case where a=l is interesting as a contilnuation of the example above 
which argued that a= 1 might actually be descriptive of the legal productiv- 
ity in the United States. In the technical jargon, the giame under the En- 
glish rule has no solution if a=l. The litigants each have an incentive to 
hire more lawyer time beyond that of their opponent blecause ly spendillg 
enough they can force the opponent to pay both legal fees. The demand for 
lawyers is infinite. Thus if the facts about the legal productivity in the 
United States are as conjectured in the example, the implementation of the 
pure English rule in the United States could result il a virtual explosion of 
legal fees. 
3.3. MIXED RULE 
The symlmetric Nash equililbrinum tllder the mixed rule is given by)' tile 
formula:3 
CX = CY = - A. 
2 atp+3 - a+ 1J 
3. Because of symmetry only the strategy of th'e plaintifllt' needs to b1 c'onsi(dcred' ill the 
demonstration. The problem is to fiind the Imaximumll of 
II(x,y) = P(A - 3Cx) + (1 - P)(-Cx - (1 - P3)Cy) 
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This rule becomes the American rule as j3 aplroaches 0 and it b)ecomes the 
English rule as B approaches 1. 
The model can be used to develop all interesting hypothesis about the 
legal production function in England. If the legal fees are hourlv (as op- 
posed to contingent) and are known as a percent of recovery, and if 3 is 
known as part of the procedures, then the magniture of' a can be deduced 
from the forlnula. Thus from two pieces of data, conjecture s about the pro- 
ductivity of lawyers in England can be developed. Of course the relialility 
of such conjectures are (lependent upon all of the special assumptio ns a)bout 
the legal technology, the legal production function, and so forth. 
The mixed rule permits the derivation of a measure of the potential 
difference in resources absorbed in legal fees under the two rules. Let 
X,f = hours legal services used by plaintiff in equililriluml under the 
mixed rule at a cost of CX^A 
XA = hours legal services used by plaintiff in equililbriumn under the 
American rule at a cost of CXA 
The difference in cost in legal fees to plaintiff of the mixed rile and the 
American rule is the (uantity CX^A - CXA. Substituting firom the fomlnulas 
above we obtain: 
oA oA 
CXM - CXA = 
2((xB + 13 - a + 1) 4 
xAA 1 1 
2 [L + P-a+ 1 2 
for anv given level of y. The first-order condition is 
an(x,y) aP aP 
= (A - PCx) + P(-3C) + ( - )(-Cx (1 - ( )C1 ) + (1 - P)(-C) = O. 
dx adx ax 
aP a 1 
Because we seek a siymmetric Nasli equilib}riumn we have X - . = -, P = - at the e(lui- 
ax 4x 2 
lil)riim. Substituting into the first-order condition we get 
oA xa3C oC aC C 
- (-2 + 1)-= 0 
4x 4 2 4 2 
which siimplifies to 
cLA 
Cx = 
2(ao3 + p - a + 1) 
as claimed. 
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Analysis of this formula can demonstrate that if P<1, the mixed rule 
always generates more legal fees than does the American rule. Further- 
more, if a=l, then the (lifference CXM - CXA 1)ecomes infinite as P ap- 
proaches 1. That is, the extra expenses of the mixed rule over the American 
rule become infinitely large as the mixed rule approaches the pure English 
rule case. Of course these conclusions are completely depenlent upon the 
"legal technology" and other features of the specific functions chosen for 
the analysis. 
4. CLOSING REMARKS 
The analysis above points to an inherent instability of the English rule. 
This instability can be reduced if the court departs from the pure English 
rule and fails to award all of the winner's legal fees. Thus the rule becomes 
mixed and as discussed above the nmotivation to hire lawvers is reduced 
accordingly. If the court intervenes to reduce the influence of lawvyes and 
thereby moves away fi-om a lawyer-dominated system (reducing a), the in- 
stability is also reduced. The ability of lawvers to affect the amount of the 
award can produce an instability similar to the award of all lawyer fees, 
which will also be dampened if the power of the lawyers is dampenled. 
Given that a suit is inititated, the closer the system approximates the 
pure English rule, the greater will be the expenditure on legal fees. As one 
might expect, this has implications foir the conditions tunder which the 
plaintiff will initiate a case. 
The perfect equ(ilibrillum is a usefil tool with which to analyze the incen- 
tives to initiate a case. The concept presupp)oses that the individuals look to 
the expected equilibrium outcome of the conflict before deciding to engage 
in it. They do not look to the iimmediate benefits of hiring a lawyer, and 
instead look to the final equilibrium result of a path before initiating travel 
over that path. 
Since the game is symmetric the probability of winning is 1/2 in equilib- 
rium. Let X be the equilibrium number of legal hours employed by plain- 
tiff. For any degree of mnixe(l rule 3 > 0 (with 3=0 no equilibriuim exists) 
the expected profits of the plaintiff are positive if and only if 
1 
CX < -A. 
2 
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That is, the perfect equilil)rium model predicts that plaintiff will initiate 




So, according to this model, the likelihood of a suit goes up (because legal 
costs go to zero as c goes to zero) as lawyers are less productive. The limit 
of no productivity (a=O) means that a suit occurs whenever A is positive. 
For a given legal technology (fixed o), the incentive for litigation goes up as 
P goes up. That is, the American rule tends to induce litigation because of 
the lower legal fees at equilibrium. In the pure English system, individuals 
with a complaint do not take action because the awards will simply go to 
the lawyers if they do. Potential litigants face a possible infinite loss for an 
expected gain of - A. That is, under the pure English rule, no avenue for 
remedy is open to individuals. 
The model yields some insight about the principles that govern the sys- 
tems. The pure English system is inherently unstable. Of course, bank- 
ruptcy and the financial limitation on both sides dampen the process. The 
financial limitation of litigants has the effect of lowering the expected recov- 
ery and of increasing the likelihood that a litigant must pay his/her own 
legal fees, even if an award is won. If the litigants do not have bounded 
exposure, the legal fees literally go to infinity independent of the award, 
once litigation is initiated. In order to prevent such big legal fees, the 
courts can intervene to implement B3 > 0 and thereby move toward the 
American system by forcing a successful plaintiff to bear a portion of the 
legal fees. The court can also change legal procedures in ways that make 
lawyers less productive, that is, reduce a. Both actions will have a dampen- 
ing effect on the litigation costs under the English rule and given the inher- 
ent instability of the English rule, one might expect such procedures and 
rules to evolve to dampen the explosive nature of the process. 
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